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I. INTRODUCTION
There appears to be a commonly held belief among some municipal wel-
fare administrators in the Province of Ontario that they are the reposi-
tories of a rare and "royal" power known as "absolute discretion". These
self-styled mini-monarchs reign over their municipal kingdoms in seem-
ingly arbitrary fashion sometimes making unreasoned decisions that ser-
iously affect the day to day lives of their imagined "subjects". The pur-
poses of this paper are to examine the legal limits of discretion in wel-
fare decisions and to analyze the possible problems inherent in bringing
an application for judicial review when those legal limits seem to have
been exceeded.
A few examples will help to illustrate the nature of the decisions under
consideration.1 Each of these decisions was made in response to individ-
ual applications under the "special assistance" or "supplementary aid"
sections of the General Welfare Assistance Act, which will be examined
in detail below.
Example #1: A young paraplegic, living in Toronto, applied for supple-
mentary aid. His only source of income was a $400 per month disability
Policy Manual (Ministry of Community and Social Services), detailed figures on
expenditures for General Welfare Assistance in the City of London and the City
of Thunder Bay; a Ministry Budget Worksheet for the Calculation of Special As-
sistance; two memos from the Commissioner of Community Services for Metro-
politain Toronto concerning Supplementary and Special Assistance Expendi-
tures, an excerpt from the Agenda of the Meeting of the Community and Protec-
tive Services Committee dealing with those memos and setting Metro Toronto
policy; a letter from the Deputy Administrator of Welfare for the City of London
to an applicant for Supplementary Aid, asserting that a limit of $500.00 per year
per person in Supplementary Aid is imposed by the Province; and a letter from
the Administrator of Welfare for the City of London to an Applicant indicating
that only 90% of the cost of any Special Assistance or Supplementary Aid will be
paid by Welfare. The author is prepared to make any or all of these documents
available to interested parties who contact her.
1 All examples are accounts of actual cases related to the author either by the
applicant or by an agency social worker who assisted the applicant.
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pension provided under the Family Benefits Act 2 His request was for
approximately $300 to pay for a one-year supply of genito-urinary sup-
plies necessitated by his disability. His application was processed and
he was informed of the decision by a social worker from the local wel-
fare office: the municipality would cost-share the items with the ap-
plicant on a 50/50 basis. Unfortunately, the applicant, who was already
living well below the poverty level, did not have $150 to allocate to-
ward the purchase of the required supplies. When the Welfare depart-
ment was initially challenged on this "cost-sharing" decision the reply
was: "That is our policy." When the matter was pursued at the provin-
cial level, and the welfare administrator was questioned by a senior of-
ficial from the Ministry of Community and Social Services, the decision
became "a mistake" and the applicant received full funding.
Example #2: An elderly man living in Oxford County applied for supple-
mentary aid. His only source of income was an Old Age Security pension.
His request was for assistance with the purchase of dentures, as he re-
cently had to have all of his teeth extracted. The local municipal wel-
fare office rejected his application, without reasons.
Example #3: A young woman, living in London, Ontario, applied for sup-
plementary aid for the purchase of a $3,000 wheelchair. Her only source
of income was a $400 per month provincial disability pension. She was
told that the policy of the municipality was to require each employed
applicant for an assistive device to pay 10% of the cost of the device.
Not only did she not have $300 to use toward the purchase of a wheel-
chair, but she was not employed. The policy was applied to her appli-
cation regardless.
Example #4: A young woman in Toronto was a welfare recipient. She
was also a drug addict. She applied for special assistance to pay for
part of a drug treatment program which was not covered under the Onta-
rio Health Insurance Plan (OHIP). Her application was initially reject-
ed because "special assistance is not used to fund individuals residing in
institutions". However, her application clearly indicated she was liv-
ing in the community in an apartment. When this error was pointed out,
the application was then rejected for the reason that "special assistance
is not provided for medically related items". When it was pointed out
that the Act itself permits the provision of assistance for the medically
related items, a policy statement written by the municipal social service
committee was forwarded. This policy statement indicated that funding
2 R.S.O. 1980, c. 151.
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would not be provided for long-term treatment programs. It was finally
on this basis that the application was rejected.
Initially this paper will explore these two discretionary sections
(special assistance and supplementary aid) of the General Welfare As-
sistance Act , and the nature of decisions rendered pursuant to them.
First, the general legislative framework will be examined in some de-
tail. Second, relevant statutory and common law requirements for the ex-
ercise of discretion will be discussed along with the legal ramnifications
of breaches of those requirements. Third, an analysis will be undertaken
of the likelihood of a successful application for judicial review, based on
elements of the above four examples, and framed in terms of abuse of dis-
cretion. Non-judicial remedies will also be examined briefly in a discus-
sion of the policy framework within the welfare system operates.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
In making decisions regarding applications for supplementary aid and
special assistance, welfare administrators are to operate within the
bounds set out in the General Welfare Assistance Act and regulations.4
There is, in addition, a large compendium of Policy Guidelines' pub-
lished by the Ministry of Community and Social Services and distributed
to all welfare departments in the Province. The Policy Guidelines are
intended to establish a generally uniform delivery of welfare services
across Ontario and to "flesh-out" the Act and Regulations with up-to-
date Ministry interpretations and implementation prodecures. The legal
import of these Guidelines will be discussed below.
A. CLASSES OF ASSISTANCE
The Act distinguishes the provision of general welfare, which is worded
in the language of a statutory duty, from the provision of other assis-
tance, which is worded in a discretionary way.
s.7(1) "A municipality shall provide assistance in accor-
dance with the regulations to any person in need who re-
3 R.S.O. 1980, c.188.
4 R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441.
5 General Welfare Policy Guidelines, Ministry of Community and
Social Services, Ontario.
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sides in the municipality and who is eligible for such assis-
tance." (emphasis added)
(2) "A municipality may provide assistance in accordance
with the regulations to any other person who resides in the
municipality and who is eligible for such assistance."
(emphasis added)
Section 7 of Regulation 441 (R.R.O. 1980) goes on to define more specifi-
cally the classes of assistance that are available.
s.7 '"The classes of assistance are general assistance, special
assistance, supplementary aid..."
Basically, once an individual is in receipt of general assistance (or is in
receipt of any other government pension or private income in excess of
welfare levels), he or she is no longer "a person in need" as determined by
sections 1(2), 12 and 13, of the Regulations.6 Therefore, if the applicant's
"real" budgetary needs (as distinguished from the very restricted needs
set out in the Regulations), exceed his limited income, his application
for municipal welfare assistance will either be in the form of supplemen-
tary aid or special assistance, and, as previously noted, these fall with-
in s.7(2) of the Act and are classified as discretionary rather than man-
datory assistance.
These two types of assistance are authorized in different places in the
legislation. Supplementary aid is provided for in s.13 of the Act.
6 Section 7(1) is the basis for the provision of general welfare assistance to
"persons in need". "Person in need" is defined by s.1(2) of the Regulations:
1(2) For the purposes of the Act and this Regulation, "person in need"
means a person who by reason of,
(a) inability to obtain regular employment;
(b) lack of a principal family provider;
c) disability; or
(d) old age,
has budgetary requirements as determined in accordance with section 12 that
exceed his income as determined under section 13 and who is not otherwise
made ineligible for assistance under the Act or this Regulation."
Section 11 of the Regulations goes on to state that "general assistance shall be
paid to... a person in need..." It follows that the other two forms of assistance are
available to applicants who are not "in need" as defined by the legislation.
The analysis is somewhat confused by the Policy Guidelines, section 0405-03
(para 1), which re-defines "person in need" for the purposes of special assistance
as "one who by reason of financial hardship has budgetary needs in excess of
his-her income".
(1987), 2 Journal of Law and Social Policy
s.13 "A municipality or the Province may provide assistance
by way of supplementary aid to or on behalf of recipients of
governmental benefits."7
Special assistance, on the other hand, is not found in the Act but is out-
lined in section 15 of the Regulations (and defined in similar fashion in
section 1(1)(0) of the Regulations):
s.15 (1) "Subject to sections 3 and 5, items, services or pay-
ments of special assistance approved by the municipality...
may be paid or provided to or on behalf of a person,
(a) by a municipality, where the person resides in a munic-
ipality...
in such amounts as shall be determined by the welfare ad-
ninistrator but not exceeding the amount by which the bud-
getary requirements of the person as determined in accor-
dance with subsection (4) exceeds his income determined in
accordance with section 13...
(4) For the purpose of subsection (1), budgetary require-
ments shall be determined as follows:
1. For basic needs, an amount determined in accordance
with paragraph 1,2,4,or 4(a) of s.12(2)...
7. The cost of drugs prescribed by a physician or dental
surgeon.
8. The cost of surgical supplies and dressings.
9. The cost of dental services.
10. The cost of one or more prosthetic appliances including
eye-glasses...
16. Any other special service, item or payment in addition
to those set out in paragraphs I to 15 authorized by the Di-
rector."
7 "Recipient of a governmental benefit" is defined in section 10) of the Act and
section 2 of the Regulations as persons who receive income under the Old Age
Security Act, the Family Benefits Act, the Vocational Rehabilitation Services Act,
the Ontario Guaranteed Annual Income Act, or a spouses allowance under the
Old Age Security Act.
Discretionary Power in the G.W.AA.
To summarize, supplementary aid is generally available to disadvan-
taged recipients of some governmental income maintenance program oth-
er than general welfare. Special assistance is available to those indi-
viduals already receiving general welfare or to low income wage earners.
When such an applicant applies for special assistance or supplementary
aid his or her "budgetary requirements" are to be calculated so as to in-
clude the cost of the extraordinary item(s) requested.8
It is interesting to note that the Province administratively treats these
two forms of discretionary assistance in the same manner, even though
supplementary aid is never given detailed treatment in the legislation
while special assistance is outlined quite clearly. For example, in the
Policy Guidelines the municipalities are told that the items pre-
approved for provincial cost-sharing under special assistance can also be
used for supplementary aid, as can the same needs test and liquid assets
test be used.9 In the remainder of this paper, for the sake of convenience,
these two classes of assistance will be referred to jointly as
"supplementary benefits", except where that leads to inaccuracy in spe-
cific instances.
(An interesting study might be undertaken to determine if municipalities
are as willing to provide an assistive device to an individual already on
welfare (i.e. as special assistance) as they are to recipients of other gov-
ernment benefits (i.e. as supplementary aid) since the Municipality is re-
imbursed for only 50% of amounts paid out for special assistance but for
80% of that paid out in supplementary aid.).
8 Special Assistance Budget Worksheet.
9 General Welfare Policy Guidelines, page GW-0405-04, Appendix 2.
10 R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441, s.15(5).
11 R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441, s.16. This strange anomoly was discussed with a Mini-
stry official who explained the higher reimbursement rate for supplementary aid
as an attempt of the Province to "take care of our own". In other words, many ap-
plicants for supplementary aid will be recipients of a provincial allowance under
the Family Benefits Act, while most applicants for special assistance will be on
general welfare, which is seen as a municipal responsibility. Historically the
Province seemed to feel a greater responsibility for providing for the extraordi-
nary needs of its own F.B.A. recipients. Both classes of assistance are, in fact,
cost-shared with the Federal government under the Canada Assistance Plan Act
(CAP), with the federal government paying for 50% of the cost of both classes. In
cases of supplementary aid, however, the Province picks up another 30%, leaving
the municipality with only 20%.
(1987), 2 Journal of Law and Social Policy
B. STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES
It is important, in any analysis of this type, to determine what responsi-
bilties are delegated in the legislation to each party taking part in the
decision making process.
As is often the case, the Act is very general, leaving the details to be
provided by the Lieutenant Governor in Council under the authority to
make regulations. That authority, as set out in section 14 of the Act is
very broad and it is therefore unlikely that any of the Regulations
which will be considered could be attacked as ultra vires. Likewise, sec-
tion 6 of the Act provides a municipal or regional welfare administrator
with broad powers of delegation, so it is unlikely that this occasionally
troublesome area will prove to be a fruitful ground for judicial review.
There are three primary delegates whose various responsibilities under
the Act may have some bearing on the nature of the discretion being ex-
ercised in granting or denying an application for supplementary benefits.
1. The Director of Income Maintenance (of the Ministry of
Community and Social Services) "shall exercise general su-
pervision over the administration of this Act and the regula-
tions and shall advise municipal welfare administrators, re-
gional welfare administrators and others as to the manner in
which their duties under this Act are to be performed. 12
(The Director "advises" welfare administrators by providing
to them a lengthy set of Policy Guidelines.)
2. The "regional welfare administrator" is employed by the
Ministry. 3 He "may receive applications for assistance and
shall determine the eligibility of each applicant for assis-
tance and, where the applicant is eligible, shall determine
the amount of assistance and direct provision thereof...' 1
4
12 This section, section 3 of the Act, is the one that gives the Director the au-
thority to publish the Policy Guidelines which are distributed to all welfare ad-
ministrators. It is possible that a welfare administrator might argue that this sec-
tion does not require him to take advice from the Director in the area of supple-
mentary benefits, as that is a discretionary area, not a "duty" under section 3.
However, the preferred interpretation would seem to be that the administrator
has a "duty" to exercise his discretion lawfully and that the Director, under sec-
tion 3, should advise him as to how that might be done.
13 R.S.O. 1980, c.188, s.l(j).
14 R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441, s.2(a). For the purposes of this paper the municipal
welfare administrator's role will be examined much more closely than that of the
regional administrator, who is not a "front-line" decision maker.
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3. The "municipal welfare adn-inistrator" is appointed by
the municipality. He "shall receive applications for assis-
tance and shall determine the elegibility of each applicant
for assistance, and, where the applicant is eligible, shall de-
termine the amount of the assistance and direct provision
thereof...""5
For the purposes of this part of the analysis several points become im-
portant. First, although the "legal weight" of the Policy Guidelines
published by the Director could become an issue in any application for ju-
dicial review, the Director clearly has authority under section 3 of the
Act to issue those guidelines, and presumably, it is incumbent upon wel-
fare administrators to take them into account in making their decisions.
This statutory relationship between the Director and welfare adminis-
trators could conceivably cause a problem if the administrators took di-
rection from the Director in such a way as to fetter their own discretion
under the Act. However, in the author's experience this has not proven
to be a problem and will not be discussed. Instead we will concentrate on
the legislative responsibilities of the two critical repositories of discre-
tion, the municipality and the municipal welfare administrator.
By way of review, under section 7(2) of the Act, the municipality "may
provide assistance in accordance with the regulations to any other person
who resides in the municipality and who is eligible for such assistance."
Furthermore, in section 13, "the municipality or the Province may pro-
vide assistance by way of supplementary aid to or on behalf of recipients
of governmental benefits." Although section 13 does not specifically
state it, by implication supplementary aid must also be provided "in ac-
cordance with the regulations" as required by section 7(2). This is be-
cause section 7(2) includes any assistance provided by the municipality
to "any other person", which would include any recipient of supplemen-
tary aid, (as well as any recipient of special assistance.)
Therefore, a municipality may provide supplementary aid or special as-
sistance, but any assistance provided must be in accordance with the leg-
islation and regulations.
What is the character of the municipality's responsibility under these
two sections? Quite dearly these are not mandatory sections but rather
discretionary. On the face of it, it looks like the municipality has the
discretion to examine every application for supplementary benefits and
15 Supra, note 13, s.4(1) and 4(2).
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determine, within the boundaries of its discretion, if it will provide as-
sistance to each individual applicant. Of course, in reality, the munici-
pality considers estimates from its social services committee and ap-
proves a general welfare budget, including funds for supplementary bene-
fits. The municipality exercises a general discretion as to whether it
will or will not provide funds for supplementary benefits to its residents.
It is not legally obliged to do so. This is the basic policy choice a munici-
pality makes under section 7(2) of the Act. That is not to say it is the
only policy decision that the municipality can make. The nature of oth-
er municipal policies or rules that are adopted to implement its major de-
cision (of providing supplementary benefits) will be examined in greater
detail later. However, for our present purposes the primary decision for
the municipality will be viewed as that of deciding whether to provide
any class of assistance other than the mandatory class of general wel-
fare. 6
Once the municipality has decided to provide funds for the classes of
supplementary aid and special assistance (and provided any supporting
policies or rules) what then is the statutory responsibility of the welfare
administrator? His or her duty is spelled out, as already mentioned, in
section 4(2) of the Act. She or he "shall receive applications for assis-
tance and shall determine the eligibility of each applicant for assis-
tance, and, where the applicant is eligible, shall determine the amount
of the assistance and direct provision thereof..."
Although there may be elements of discretion involved in how the wel-
fare administrator carries out his responsibilities, it is clear that his or
her basic role under the Act is not a discretionary one. He or she is
charged with certain duties and is legally bound to carry out those du-
ties in accordance with the legislation. For example, once the munici-
pality had allotted funds for supplementary benefits, the welfare ad-
ministrator would act unlawfully in refusing receipt of an application.
Likewise, if the administrator determined (in accordance with the leg-
islation) that an applicant was eligible for assistance he or she would
act unlawfully if he refused to direct "provision thereof".
Therefore, although the supplementary benefits sections of the General
Welfare Assistance Act can correctly be referred to as discretionary in
origin, it is not clear that the discretion goes as far as some municpal
16 In fact every municipality in Ontario has chosen to provide special assis-
tance and supplementary aid to its residents, and where there is no consolidated
municipality the Province provides it.
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welfare administrators would like to believe.
Does this mean that once a municipality has approved funds for supple-
mentary benefits that every application must be automatically ap-
proved? Do supplementary benefits then become as entrenched as gener-
al welfare? What discretion remains to the municipality and welfare
administrators? These questions will be dealt with in the following sec-
tions.
C. NATURE OF THE DISCRETION: STATUTORY INDICATORS
(i) The Municipality's Discretion
The initial discretion vested in the municipality is clear - to provide or
not to provide for the two discretionary classes of assistance. However,
once the decision to provide supplementary benefits has been made, the
issues become more complicated.
Any court would accept that in the allocation of limited resources a mu-
nicipality should be permitted some discretion in setting policies regard-
ing how those resources are to be distributed. But, as Evans says:
"To say that somebody has a discretion presupposes that
there is no uniquely right answer... There may, however, be a
number of answers that are wrong in law."'17
The task at hand then is to determine which municipal answers "are
wrong in law", and what criteria a court might use to make such a find-
ing.
Once again we turn to the legislation for guidance. It has already been
seen that section 7(2) of the Act stipulates that "a municipality may
provide [supplemental benefits] in accordance with the regulations".
The legislature did not envisage that each municipality that chose to
provide supplementary benefits could do so entirely on its own terms.
Therefore, it is again clear that any policies set by a municipality must
conform with the regulations."5
17 Evans, de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (4th ed., 1980) at
278.
18 By way of contrast, there is a series of cases decided under the Manitoba So-
cial Allowances Act, which permits each municipality to provide even general
welfare assistance according to the by-laws of that municipality. See Leblanc v.
City of Transcona (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 549 (S.C.C.); Keehn v. Benito (1985), 34
Man. L.R. (2d) 156.
See also the very interesting challenge to the Manitoba legislation on the
(1987), 2 Journal of Law and Social Policy
The first regulation of relevance is s.15(1) of Regulation 441, which
reads:
"15(1)... services or payments of special assistance approved
by the municipality... may be paid or provided to or on behalf
of a person... in such amounts as shall be determined by the
welfare administrator but not exceeding the amount by which
the budgetary requirements of the person as determined in ac-
cordance with subsection (4) exceeds his income determined in
accordance with section 13..."
There are several points that need to be made about this section. First it
seems to support the author's initial interpretation of the municipality's
discretion in general. In other words, the municipality may approve pol-
icies with regard to "services or payments", but the specific amount in
each case is determined by the welfare administrator under s.4(2) of the
Act.
Second, section 15(1) reiterates the limitation placed on the municipali-
ty in section 7(2) of the Act which was to provide assistance in accor-
dance with the regulations. Also, by providing a maximum calculation,
s. 15(1) allows the welfare administrator some discretion in providing an
amount less than the amount by which the applicant's budgetary re-
quirements exceed his income. However, that income is to be determined
in accordance with section 13 of the Regulations, and any amount given
that is less than the maximum is presumably supposed to bear some rela-
tionship to the specific application under consideration. Again, it be-
comes obvious that the legislature did not intend for each municipality
to provide assistance in any fashion it preferred. Once a municipality
chooses to provide special assistance, any policies or rules it sets with re-
gard to services or payments, or any related matter, must be done in accor-
dance with the regulations.
All that remains to explore is section 13. Section 13 is a long and compli-
cated part of the Regulations that is to be used in calculating the income
of any applicant for any class of assistance under the Act. Basically, the
section lists items that are to be included in calculating an applicant's in-
come. (eg. wages, payments for support or maintenance, pension pay-
ments, etc.), and items that are not to be included in an applicant's in-
come (eg. welfare benefits, charitable donations received, casual gifts of
small value, etc.) However, section 13 does more than just provide lists.
ground that it violates the agreement under the Canada Assistance Plan Act, in
Finlay v. Ministry of Justice (1983), 48 N.R. 126, (Fed, C.A.).
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It carefully distinguishes between applicants in various social settings.
For example, gross income is used in certain instances and net income in
others. The regulation also exempts part of the earnings of the applicant
at the discretion of the welfare administrator, but these exemptions
vary. For instance, one of the exemptions from income is up to $50 per
month for a single person but up to $100 for a head of family not living
with a spouse. For these single parents it is also permissible to deduct
$40 per month for work-related expenses. In other words, the Regula-
tions recognize different basic income needs for different family situa-
tions and the welfare administrator, after examining each application
on its merits, is supposed to use his or her discretion in applying these
statutory rules to the fact situation. We will now examine in greater de-
tail the legislative constraints placed on the welfare administrator's
powers of decision making.
(ii) The Welfare Administrator's Discretion
Some analysis has already been done of the welfare administrator's dis-
cretion, under section 15(1) of the Regulations, to determine the amount
of special assistance that will be granted, based on a determination of
the budgetary needs and income of the applicant. It has been shown that
while some discretion does exist in this area, the administrator's calcu-
lations must be performed in accordance with the Act and Regulations.
The welfare administrator cannot go so far as to arbitrarily ignore sourc-
es of income, budgetary needs, or the results of his calculations.
It has also been shown that the welfare administrator's basic duties
under the Act, as set out in section 4(2), are not discretionary. He shall
receive applications, shall determine eligibility, and where the appli-
cant is eligible shall determine the amount of assistance and direct pro-
vision thereof. There are further statutory guidelines relating to these
duties. The process of "determining eligibility" is set out in section 8(5)
of the Regulations:
"In determining the eligibility of an applicant for any assis-
tance, a welfare administrator shall make or cause to be
made an enquiry into the living conditions and financial and
other circumstances of the applicant..."(emphasis added).
Section 10(2) of the Act provides the final statutory guideline rele-
vant to this analysis of the responsibilities of the welfare administra-
tor:
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10(2) A welfare administrator may refuse to provide or may
suspend or cancel assistance under the Act where,
(a) the applicant or recipient is not or ceases to be entitled
thereto or eligible therefor under this Act or the Regulations;
(b) the applicant or recipient fails to provide.., the informa-
tion required to determine initial or continuing entitlement to
or eligibility for assistance...; or
(c) any other ground for refusal, suspension or cancellation
specified in the regulations exists.
One should note that s.10(2) applies to suspension or cancellation of
"assistance", not just general assistance. Presumably then it applies to
supplementary aid and special assistance as well. The obvious signifi-
cance of this section is that it indicates that the welfare administrator
cannot arbitrarily refuse assistance to an applicant. A refusal, (or sus-
pension or cancellation) must be based on some ground outlined in s.10(2)
or in the Regulations. Because the cases at hand represent applications
for supplementary benefits, one additional reason for finding an appli-
cant ineligible under s.10(2)(a), that would not be present in applications
for general welfare, could be a municipal policy excluding the requested
item or service from municipal funding. In other words, as in the example
of Metro Toronto deciding not to fund long-term treatment programs, an
applicant for supplementary benefits can be found to be ineligible under
s.10(2)(a) because funding for the item is simply not authorized. A wel-
fare administrator may then lawfully refuse to provide assistance
(assuming, of course, that the municipal policy is lawful and that the
application at hand has at least been considered as a possible exception
to the rule.)
However, having said that, it must also be noted that section 10(2) is not
open-ended. Only those reasons listed are lawful reasons for refusing as-
sistance. By implication, then, all other reasons are unlawful. It would
be very unlikely that a welfare administrator would refuse to provide
assistance for supplementary benefits for the stated reason that he or she
did not like the specific applicant, or did not like disabled people, or
did not like single mothers. However, what about the not so uncommon
situation where the welfare administrator, as in example #2, simply re-
fuses assistance with no stated reasons? There is case law, which will be
discussed below, on both sides of the issue of a requirement to provide
reasons for ones decisons.
What conclusions can be drawn at this point about the nature of the du-
ties and discretionary powers of the municipality and the welfare ad-
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ministrator, as delineated in the legislation itself? On the one hand,
the Act permits the municpality the discretion to choose whether or not
to provide supplementary benefits. However, once it decides, as a matter
of policy, to provide such classes of assistance then it must operate with-
in the bounds set by letter and intent of the legislation. Subsidiary rules
set by the municipality, in furtherance of its policy, must not violate the
legislation and, in addition, must appear to be "reasonable", as opposed
to arbitrary or capricious. This can only be determined by examining the
context, wording and application of the rules in question.
On the other hand, the welfare administrator's responsibilities under
the legislation amount to a subtle combination of duty and discretion.
While he has a duty to accept applications, determine eligibility and
provide assistance to eligible applicants, there are some minor areas of
discretion involved, particularly in calculating income and income ex-
emptions. In exercising his discretion the welfare administrator may not
go too far afield so as to violate the legislation or frustrate the purposes
of the Act. Nor can the administrator fetter his or her own discretion by
deciding according to inflexible, pre-deternilned rules.19
The next major portion of the paper will be devoted to an examination of
the case law, as part of our analysis of the feasibility of pursuing an ap-
plication for judicial review against a municipality and/or welfare ad-
ministrator for abuse of discretion. This involves a discussion of the
scope of judicial review in this area, the intensity of review and some
specific, recognized grounds for judicial review of discretionary powers.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHORITIES
'In public regulation of this sort there is no such thing as abso-
lute and untrammeled "discretion", that is that action can be
taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to
the mind of the administrator; no legislative Act can, without
express language, be taken to contemplate an unlimited arbi-
trary power, exercisable for any purpose, however capricious
or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the sta-
tute... "Discretion" necessarily implies good faith in dis-
19 But see the unfortunate and poorly reasoned case of Alden v. Gaglardi
(1972), 30 D.L.R (3d) 760 (S.C.C.), where the Court found that the provision of all
welfare assistance in British Columbia is discretionary, and that a blanket policy
excluding all applicants who have been 'locked out" in labour disputes is valid.
(1987), 2 Journal of Law and Social Policy
charging public duty; there is always a perspective within
which a statute is intended to operate..."2
This passage, from the famous Canadian case on abuse of discretion, Ron-
carelli v. Duplessis, states the basic legal principle in the area and the
framework within which an examination of authorities must take place.
'"here is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to op-
erate"; the task now is to explore the perspective within which a court
might find the General Welfare Assistance Act is intended to operate.
This will be accomplished through an examination of case law and rele-
vant principles of judicial review.
A. INTENSITY OF REVIEW ISSUES
(i) Judicial or Administrative Discretion
Discretion is an area where the courts have shown a greater willingness
to become involved in recent years, which is either encouraging or not,
depending on one's views of the value of judicial interference in adminis-
trative decision making.'
Historically, however, the exercise of discretion by a municipality and
administrator of the kinds presently under consideration would not have
been seen as proper subjects of judicial review. This is because it would
have been difficult to characterize their functions as "judicial". The
municipality, in exercising its very broad discretion of whether to pro-
vide supplementary benefits at all, is certainly the repository of a pure-
ly administrative/policy type of power. It is difficult to imagine a court
finding, even today, any requirements that the municipality act judicial-
ly at this point in the administrative process.
Later in the decison-making process, when both the municipality and
the welfare administrator are required to act "in accordance with the
Act and Regulations" it might be possible to argue that they are re-
quired to act quasi-judicially, although it must be remembered that
there is no requirement, in dealing with applications for supplementary
benefits, that the administrator afford the applicant even an opportuni-
20 [1959] S.C.R. 121.
21 See, for example, Arthurs, "Protection Against Judicial Review", [19831 Revue
de Barreau 277; and Austin, "Judicial Review of Subjective Discretion - At the
Rubicon, Whither Now?" [1975] Current Legal Problems 150.
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ty to be heard before suspending or refusing assistance, nor is there any
provision for appeal to the Social Assistance Review Board.
Historically, however, some courts came to define "acting judicially" in
very loose terms. for example, in a 1952 English case dealing with local
committees responsible for dispensing legal aid certificates, the court
said:
"Though the local committees may be said to be administra-
tive bodies in the sense that they are responsible for adminis-
tering the Act, they are quite unconcerned with questions of
policy. They cannot refuse legal aid because the fund is be-
coming depleted or because they think that certain forms of
action should be discouraged. They have to decide the matter
solely on the facts of the particular case, solely on the evi-
dence before them and apart from any extraneous considera-
tions. In other words, they must act judicially, not judicious-ly.23
This kind of reasoning could be applied to the decision making power of a
welfare administrator.
A further leap in judicial review of administrative decisions can be seen
in cases where courts expanded their scope of review to include non-
judicial type activities. For example, the Court of Appeal decision in
the controversial case of Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food said, through Lord Denning:
"It is said that the decision of the Minister is administrative
and not judicial. But that does not mean he can do as he likes,
regardless of right or wrong. Nor does it mean that the courts
are powerless to correct him."24
Again, a few years later, the Court of Appeal in England indicated its
willingness to intervene in non-judicial situations:
"It is for the council and not for this court to determine what
the future policy should be in relation to the number of taxi
licences which are to be issued in the City of Liverpool... This
Court is concerned to see that whatever policy the corpora-
22 R.S.O. 1980, c.188, s.10(3) and s.11(2).
23 R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, ex parte R.A. Brand & Co. Ltd.. [19521
2 Q.B. 413, at 431.
24 [1968] A.C. 997, at 1006.
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tion adopts is adopted after due and fair regard to all the
conflicting interests. The power of the court to intervene is not
limited, as once was thought, to those cases where the func-
tion in question is judicial or quasi-judicial. The modern cases
show that this court will intervene more widely than in the
past. Even where the function is said to be administrative,
the court will not hesitate to intervene in a suitable case if it
is necessary in order to secure fairness."'
The cases above reflect the basic flow or direction of the courts on this is-
sue. This should not lead one to believe that there have not been many
contrary decisions, ' or decisions of courts not interested in getting into
the business of reviewing every exercise of an administrative discretion
that comes before them. However, this brief and sketchy history should
at least show that what was previously a threshold issue in reviewing
decisions of tribunals or administrators will no longer stop a court that is
intent on review. Unfortunately, the old distinction between judicial
and administrative functions could still be relied upon by a court intent on
not reviewing with much intensity. This is always a possibility in the
area of welfare rights where Canadian courts have shown little inclina-
tion to adopt an interventionist attitude, (which could be attributed, in
part, to the fact that they have been asked very few times to do so.)
(ii) Ex gratia Payments / Supplementary Benefits
A related issue, and possible stumbling block to a successful application
for judicial review of decisions involving supplementary benefits, is the
fact that these benefits may be viewed as ex gratia payments rather
than as legally enforceable rights. The small body of law coming from
English courts dealing with supplementary welfare benefits is not very
helpful because that legislation includes, supplementary benefits within
the welfare appeal process and because the structure of supplementary
benefits is less discretionary than in the Ontario Act. Although in reali-
ty the legislation here probably allows for no more discretion than the
English law, the initial ex gratia nature of this class of assistance may
colour a court's eagerness to review, or its intensity of review.
25 R. v. Liverpool Corporation, Ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operator's Associ-
ation, 1197212 Q. B. 299, at 310.
26 See, for example, The King v. Noxema Chemical Co., [19421 S.C.R. 178; and,
Calgary Power v. Copithorne, [19591 S.C.R. 24.
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The cases that are more to the point are those emanating from decisions
of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Although the English
Board was set up by a "scheme" or act of the Crown, rather than by sta-
tute, the ex gratia nature of its awards has been an issue in judicial re-
view applications. For example, in the case of R. v. Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board, Ex parte Lain, Diplock, L.J., wrote:
'True it is that a determination of the board that a particu-
lar sum by way of ex gratia payment of compensation should
be offered to an applicant does not give the applicant any
right to sue either the board or the Crown for that sum. But it
does not follow that a determination of the board in favour of
an applicant is without any legal effect upon the rights of
the applicant to whom it relates. It makes lawful a payment
to an applicant which would otherwise be unlawful... It
makes a determination by the board, in the exercise of its ju-
dicial functions, that an offer of a particular sum to a particu-
lar applicant is justified, a condition precedent to the board's
authority in the exercise of its administrative functions to
make any payment to that applicant... It is... in my opinion
quite sufficient to attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Court to quash by certiorari a determination of an infer-
ior tribunal, made in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers,
that such determination should have the effect of rendering
lawful and irrecoverable a payment to a subject which would
otherwise be unlawful... '
The courts in England have apparently not been troubled by the ex gratia
nature of an award from this Board, and seem to be saying that as long as
there exists some quasi-judicial function in the board, the courts will
have jurisdiction to review the board's exercise of that function.
It is certainly arguable that the Lain case and others could be useful in
persuading a Canadian court to seriously review the activities of a wel-
fare administrator, even in supplementary benefits cases. A determina-
tion of the administrator that an applicant is prima facie eligible for
benefits is a condition precedent to the lawful receipt of any sum, just as
in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board decisions. That determina-
tion makes "lawful a payment to an applicant which would otherwise be
unlawful", thereby having some 'legal effect upon the rights of the ap-
plicant to whom it relates". The nature of the welfare administrator's
27 R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex parte Lain, [1967] 2 Q.B. 864,
at 888-889.
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responsibility is closely akin to the responsibilities of the Legal Aid
Committee in Manchester, quite simply to accept applications and apply
the statutory criteria provided to the fact situation before them. Al-
though there remains some element of discretion in all of these decisions,
the welfare administrator is given more discretion and more extensive
criteria through the legislation than were the Legal Aid Committees
and Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. This narrows the discretion-
ary powers of the welfare administrator, or makes them more
"objective", which may assist our somewhat conservative courts in feel-
ing comfortable reviewing the manner in which that discretion has been
exercised. The matter of "objective" and "subjective" discretion will be
discussed in more detail in the next section.
The English cases discussed above have been examined in some detail be-
cause the ex gratia issue and the judicial/administrative distinction
could both become relevant in an application for judicial review of a sup-
plementary benefits decision, in spite of the fact that the Judicial Re-
view Procedure Act of Ontario defines a "statutory power of decision" as
including a decision "prescribing the legal rights, powers, [and] privileg-
es... of any person.." (emphasis added).
There does exist a Canadian judicial statement regarding the reviewa-
bility of ex gratia payments. In Re Sheehan and Criminal Injuries Com-
pensation Board, the Divisional Court decided:
'"here is no obligation of the Board to award compensation.
It could be argued that the payment is an ex gratia payment.
Even so the general intent of the Act is clear and that is to
provide compensation to victims of crime. Claimants to ex
gratia payments are entitled to have their claims considered
on a-proper basis... " 28 (emphasis added)
This would seem to adequately deal with the ex gratia issue, although,
as will be seen shortly, the court's tone regarding this issue changed con-
siderably when the Divisional Court decision was overturned on appeal.
B. LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE
DISCRETION
Thus far we have examined some cases dealing with scope of review,
more specifically the court's willingness to review exercises of discretion
28 (1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 337 at 341; reversed on other grounds (1975), 52 D.L.R.(3d) 728 (Ont. C.A.).
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in administrative (as opposed to judicial) functions, and in ex gratia /
supplementary (as opposed to "as of right") payments. Once these theo-
retical barriers have been crossed, the court will want to look very care-
fully at the legislation, as was done in the first portion of this paper, to
determine the specific nature of the discretion in question. The courts
have dealt with the many different types of discretion, in part, by at-
tempting to categorize them as "subjective" or "objective". Is the discre-
tion "subjective" in that the legislation provides no criteria for its exer-
cise and no conditions precedent to its activation? Are there statutory
duties attached to the discretion, or is it completely independent of any
other legislative responsibility? Is the discretion tied to duties and con-
fined by specific statutory criteria, thereby rendering it "objective" in
nature?
"That this distinction is a relevant one to make becomes ap-
parent when it is realized that the application by the courts
of the doctrine of substantive ultra vires , in reviewing discre-
tionary powers, depends upon the existence in the empowering
legislation of criteria against which the decision-maker's
choice can be measured. In the absence of such criteria, the
doctrine of ultra vires is impotent."29
The objective-subjective distinction is mentioned at this point because it
provides a useful way of thinking about the different types of discretion
under consideration, and because it is used implicitly by courts in their
analysis of the specific grounds for finding an exercise of discretion ultra
vires.
Briefly, it could be argued that only one of the discretionary powers in
the General Welfare Assistance Act, under consideration in this paper, is
truly "subjective" in nature. The otherwise objective tone of the powers is
set in section 7(2) of the Act which requires Municipal assistance to "any
other person" to be provided in accordance with the Regulations. This
requirement immediately provides a court with a body of legislative
"directives" to refer to in determining how the other discretionary pow-
ers in the legislation are to be exercised. The only exercise of discretion
for which there are no statutory criteria is that of whether or not the
municipality will provide the classes of supplementary aid and special
assistance in the first place.
We therefore proceed into an examination of the specific grounds for judi-
cial review of discretionary powers, with the understanding that once
29 Austin, "Judicial Review of Subjective Discretion", [1975] Current Legal Prob-
lems 150.
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the municipality chooses to provide supplementary benefits at all, any
exercise of discretion from then on has at least some specific objective cri-
teria by which its legality can be judged.
C. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW: THRESHOLD ISSUES
(i) Consideration of Irrelevant Matters - Failure to Consider Relevant
Matters - Exercise of Discretion for an Improper Purpose
As is typical in administrative law analysis, many of the grounds for re-
view that are discussed in isolation seem to merge on actual application.
For example, returning to the "10% policy" from the City of London,
(example #3), one could argue that the consideration of whether or not
someone was employed was irrelevant, since all income and work related
expenses were to have been taken into account in calculating the appli-
cant's available income. One could also argue that in applying the 10%
rule the welfare administrator was failing to consider a relevant matter
- the actual budgetary needs/income calculation.
In order to convince a court that this case was an appropriate one for re-
view, (i.e. that an irrelevant matter had been used as the basis of a sup-
plementary benefits decision) one would have to analyze the relevant
legislative sections to assist the court in determining what matters
would be relevant ones.
One could certainly argue that the "10% policy" violated both section
15(1) and section 143 of the regulations, outlined above. For example, in
a public statement of the "10% policy" the municipal committee respon-
sible for deciding welfare policy explained that in determining an ap-
plicant's eligibility for special assistance items, a provincial form is
completed (to comply with s.13) on which income is compared to budge-
tary needs (including the cost of the requested item). That memorandum
goes on to state:
"Where there are earnings defined as income realized
through employment, an earnings exemption is applied in the
completion of the form, allowing a certain amount of the earn-
ings to be exempt from consideration. However, these clients
are requested to pay 10% toward the cost of the requested
item since they have benefited from exempted income."
(emphasis added).
Clearly, section 13 of the Regulations contains no provision for requiring
an applicant to pay 10% of an item requested under special assistance or
supplementary aid. It does permit some discretion to the welfare admin-
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istrator when he or she is allowing earnings exemptions, but this discre-
tion is presumably to be used during an examination of the actual needs of
the applicant and his or her family. According to the statement from
the Committee, this permissible discretion has, in fact, already been
used in the process of completing and assessing the provincial form, as it
should be.
What seems to be left is simply the arbitrary application, to every re-
quest where earned income is present, of a requirement that the individu-
al pay 10%. In fact, after conversations with several London residents
who have been required to pay 10%, it appears that the policy is ap-
plied as rigidly as stated in the memorandum - in every situation regard-
less of the amount of earned income available. The practical consequence
of this rigid application of a pre-determined policy is that a low-income
wage earner, e.g. earning minimum wage, will be required to pay 10% of
the cost of a wheelchair for her husband, as will a single disabled ap-
plicant who is only working a total of 8 hours a week. In other words,
family situation and the amount of earned income, both relevant consid-
erations, are not taken into account.
This result appears to be a violation of both the intent and content of the
Regulations. The municipality may, under section 15, approve services
or payments of special assistance, as London has done (item 10 on the
London memorandum lists items that the municipality has approved).
However, as has been shown, this assistance and any calculations used in
determining eligibility must be done in accordance with the legislation.
There is nothing in the Act or Regulations which permits a municipality
to ignore or change the regulation relating to calculating available in-
come. Nor is there anything that permits a municipality to fetter the
discretion vested in the welfare administrator in this way. Once the
welfare administrator has correctly completed the form, having calcu-
lated the income and having used his discretion in the areas of income
exemptions and work-related expenses, this policy tells him to ignore
the results of those calculations and require the applicant to pay 10% of
the item regardless of the amount of available income.
In law , this amounts to requiring the administrator to ignore a relevant
consideration (the results of his calculations) and take into consideration
a factor that is irrelevant (simply whether the applicant "is em-
ployed", regardless of the amount of available income).
These two related grounds (irrelevant/relevant considerations) are often
discussed in the same cases with yet another ground, that of exercising
discretion for an improper purpose. For example, let us consider fact situ-
ation #4, where a Social Service Department refused to fund an appli-
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cants supplementary benefits request for a drug treatment program. A
court is not likely to attack the policy of Metropolitan Toronto as ex-
pressed in the final decision in that case, (in spite of the bumbling way in
which the application was handled). According to the policy, as stated
in the memorandum from the Social Services Committee of the munici-
pality, the Committee spent several months in consultation and meetings
with interested parties deciding on priorities in this area. There was
nothing arbitrary or unreasoned about the decision not to fund long-term
treatment programs that were not covered by the Ontario Health Insur-
ance Plan. Even if one does not agree with the content of this policy, the
procedures used by the municipality in arriving at the policy would seem
to be a fair and reasonable exercise of its discretion to allocate available
resources?' Also the decision would not be seen as an unreasonable inter-
pretation of the purpose of welfare legislation.
There are a few interesting cases where exercising discretion for the pur-
pose of saving money was viewed as improper. These are relevant to our
analysis because this is so often the reason, either implicitly or explicit-
ly, for a refusal of supplementary benefits. In the case of Re Doctors Hos-
pital and Minister of Health 31 the Divisional Court of Ontario ruled
that a discretion exercised by the Minister of Health under the Public
Hospital Act was ultra vires, in that it was exercised for an improper
purpose. The Government of Ontario had determined that in order to re-
duce the funds expended for hospital care it would close certain hospi-
tals. It chose to accomplish this by having the Minister of Health refuse
to renew the approval that was required for the hospitals to continue in
operation. The Court found that the legislation was regulatory in nature
and its purpose was primarily to ensure proper staffing, management and
operation of public hospitals.
"It has been held that even if made in good faith and with the
best of intentions, a departure by a decision-making body from
the objects and purposes of the statute pursuant to which it acts
is objectionable and subject to review by the Courts... We have
then determined from a review of the Public Hospitals Act
and its history that it is regulatory in nature. Section 4(5) was
not designed or intended to be used as a means of dosing hospi-
tals for financial or budgetary considerations... Since the Lieu-
30 It could still be argued, theoretically, that automatically excluding an entire
category of assistance, without the option of considering exceptional cases, is a
fetter on the municipality's discretion. See Policy Guidelines, 0405-03.
31 (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d) 220.
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tenant-Governor in Council in its decision took into account fi-
nancial considerations, it considered extraneous matters that
were beyond the objects and policy of the Public Hospitals
Act."
A similar outcome can be seen in the English case of Hansen v. Radcliffe
Urban District Council. I In this older case the local education authori-
ty, in an attempt to economize, tried to terminate its employment agree-
ment with the plaintiff and others, and then re-hire them at reduced
salary. The Education Act allowed the school authority the discretion
to dismiss teachers on "educational grounds". The Court found that the
desire to economize did not entitle the defendant to exercise its discretion
as that was not an "educational ground".
It would seem possible to argue along these same lines against the London
"10% policy". If the policy were coming from the welfare administrator
alone it would clearly be an abuse, as his discretion is highly controlled
by the legislation and does not extend to policy decision of this nature.
His discretion simply lies in how he applies the legislation to the facts
before him. Is it permissible for the municipality, however, to institute
such a policy for the purposes of conserving municipal revenue? In addi-
tion to the arguments previously mentioned of taking into account irrele-
vant matters, or failing to consider the actual calculation arrived at in
order to determine available income, could a court not also be persuaded
that such a policy is in direct conflict with the purpose of welfare legis-
lation? In other words, it is not improper for a municipality to arbitrari-
ly attempt to economize on the backs of the poor when the purpose of the
legislation is to provide for their "special" but still basic needs.
(It should also be noted that in the Hospital and Hansen cases obtaining
evidence of the purpose behind the decision was not a problem. There
were letters and clear statements of rationale for each decision availa-
ble to the plaintiffs (or applicants). It is not always easy to prove the
purpose for which a discretion is actually being exercised. This is espe-
cially true in the welfare area where policy manuals are considered
32 Ibid. at 230-232.
33 [192212 Ch. 490. But see Price v. Rhonda Urban District Council, 1192313 Ch.
372, where the Court upheld the discretion of the school authority to terminate
the employment of married women teachers, for the express purpose of provid-
ing employment for new teachers just completing their training but without any
prospects of securing teaching positions. Under the Elementary Education Act
the statutory power of the education authority was to be exercised so as to make
tenure at the pleasure of the board; hence the purpose behind the decision was
not for the Court to question.
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"internal" documents to which the applicant has no access, and where
reasons for decision are frequently not given.)
Again, in the more recent case of Re Multi-Malls Inc. and Minister of
Transportation and Communications ' an exercise of discretion by a Mini-
ster was found to be improper because the Court decided that he acted
upon extraneous and irrelevant considerations. His discretion, vested
under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act to issue
or refuse to issue access permits to parcels of land abutting public high-
ways, was exercised for an improper purpose. The Court of Appeal found
that a refusal to issue a permit because the proposed use of the land con-
flicted with the municipality's official plan was an irrelevant consider-
ation under the legislation, the purpose of which was traffic planning.
Of course, this case involved land use where our courts tend to be more
willing to intervene anyway. There was also extensive correspondence
available to give the Court some insight into the purpose behind the
Minister's decison.
At the opposite end of the "interventionist" scale is the Ontario Court of
Appeal decison in Re Sheehan and Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board . The applicant for compensation from the Board had been an
inmate in Kingston Penitentiary where he was twice assaulted by fellow
inmates. His application was denied by the Board primarily because he
had been convicted of criminal offences himself and would not have been
in the penitentiary in the first place had that not been so. (In other
words, the Board did not consider him a very worthy recipient of an
award.) The Divisional Court had decided that although the Board,
under its enabling legislation, had very broad discretion to consider "any
behaviour of the victim that directly or indirectly contributed to his in-
jury or death", that the behaviour so considered by the Board had to be
relevant to the injuries sustained. Therefore, the fact the Sheehan had
undertaken criminal behaviour in the past, and was consequently in pris-
on, was not relevant to the injuries that were the subject of the applica-
tion. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the Divisional Court in a
decision that permitted the Board great discretion in deciding what con-
siderations were relevant to its decisions. The Court of Appeal decision
was based, in part, on the very broad, subjective language of the Law En-
forcement Compensation Act.
34 (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 49.
35 supra note 28.
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"s.3(1) The Board... may make an order in its discretion in ac-
cordance with this Act..."
And furthermore, the Board may:
s.5... "have regard to all such circumstances as it considers rel-
evant, including any behaviour of the victim that directly or
indirectly contributed to his injury or death." (emphasis add-
ed)
The Court of Appeal was dearly influenced by this subjective language
in the Act. Justice Kelly wrote:
"In my opinion the Divisional Court erred when it considered
that its task was to determine if the said circumstances were
relevant. In the light of the discretion vested in the Board to
have regard to all circumstances which it considered relevant
so long as it acted in good faith, the decision of the Board as to
what considerations are relevant is unchallengable..."3'
However, the Court was willing to review a decision of the Board if it
acted arbitrarily, capriciously, failed to observe principles of natural
justice, or if it made relevant a consideration which is "patently irrele-
vant". This Court was obviously much less willing than was the Divi-
sional Court to review the decision of the Board with any high level of
intensity. Unfortunately, it is obvious that part of the Court's reluctance
to intervene was also based on what the Court perceived as an ex gratia
award:
"It should be emphasized that this is not an instance where
the Board has a precise jurisdiction within which it may , by
its discretion, hold that an applicant is one entitled to his
rights granted under statute, regulation or contract. The appli-
cant has, under this legislation, no right to compensation, his
right being limited to making an application therefore to the
Board."37
There are strong arguments to be made that this was not, in fact, an ex
gratia award. Furthermore, other Courts seemed to be moving in the di-
rection of the Divisional Court's earlier reasoning in this case, that even
claimants to ex gratia payments are entitled to have their claims con-
sidered on a "proper basis."
36 (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 728, at 734. See also Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223.
37 Ibid. at 732.
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It is important to note that the legislation in this case was much less ob-
jective than the welfare legislation we have been analyzing. There was
much less legislative direction to the Board in how its discretion should
be exercised and there were no regulations at all - in other words, there
are fewer "hooks" for a Court to hang its "ultra vires hat" on in the re-
view process.
It is interesting that subsequent to the Sheehan case the Compensation
For Victims of Crime Act was amended so that now the Board "shall
have regard to all relevant circumstances". 8  Also, in the more recent
case of Dalton and Criminal Injuries Compensation Board " the Divi-
sional Court ruled that the Board, in failing to consider the extent of the
victim's injuries, had failed to consider a relevant circumstance. The
case was not appealed.
(ii) Effect of Failure to State Reasons
Although failure to state reasons is not a ground for reviewing an exercise
of discretion (unless the legislation requires reasons) it is an issue that
must be dealt with by the courts in reviewing for abuse on other grounds.
Basically, where the court sees a valid ground for review, the absence of
reasons will not deprive the applicant of his action. This is especially
true where there is an appeal available from the initial decision, as the
courts will not allow the decision maker to deprive an individual of a
statutory right of appeal by not providing reasons. Some courts have
drawn a negative inference from the decision maker's refusal to give rea-
sons and have inferred an improper reason for the exercise of his or her
discretion. This raises the possibility that a court might draw such an
inference when a welfare administrator refuses to give reasons for a neg-
ative decision on an application for supplementary benefits, as occurred
in fact situation #2. Although the welfare Act does not require reasons,
and does not provide a right of appeal in these cases, it does stipulate in
section 10(2) the conditions under which a welfare administrator can le-
gally refuse or cancel assistance. Where the applicant can show prima
facie eligibility for assistance a court may infer that none of the condi-
tions in s.10(2) were present and that the administrator is therefore im-
properly exercising his or her discretion.
38 Compensation For Victims of Crime Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.82, s.17(1). (emphasis
added).
39 (1982), 36 O.R. (2d) 394.
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For example, in the case of Minister of National Revenue and Wrights'
Canadian Ropes Ltd., (on appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada),
the Privy Council inferred an arbitrary exercise of discretion when the
Minister disallowed business expenses, which in his discretion he deter-
mined to be in excess of what was reasonable or normal for the business in
question, but where he refused to disclose the report and recommendation
of the local tax inspector.
"Their Lordships find nothing in the language of the Act or in
the general law which would compel the Minister to state his
reasons for taking action under section 6(2). But this does not
necessarily mean that the Minister by keeping silence can de-
feat the taxpayer's appeal... The court is... always entitled to
examine the facts which are shown in evidence to have been
before the Minister when he made his determination. If those
facts are in the opinion of the court insufficient in law to sup-
port it, the determination cannot stand. In such a case the de-
termination can only have been an arbitrary one... The only in-
ference which... can legitimately be drawn from the available
evidence is that apart from the documents which were before
the court, the Minister had no material before him which
influenced his mind in making the determination he did."
Again, in the important case of Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fish-
eries and Food, the Privy Council addressed the issue of whether a Mini-
ster must give reasons for his decision where it is not required by the leg-
islation. In this case the Minster refused to exercise his discretion to re-
fer a complaint by producers, who were controlled by a Milk Marketing
Scheme, to a committee of investigation. Although the Minister did
give the reason that he did not feel this complaint was a suitable one for
investigation, he would go no further and contended that he was not re-
quired to give any reasons at all. Lord Reid said:
"It was argued that the Minister is not bound to give any rea-
sons for refusing to refer a complaint to the Committee, that if
he gives no reasons his decision cannot be questioned, and that
it would be very unfortunate if giving reasons were to put him
in a worse position. But I do not agree that a decision cannot be
questioned if no reasons are given. If it is the Ministry's duty
not to act so as to frustrate the policy and objects of the Act,
and if it were to appear from all the circumstances of the case
40 [1947] A.C. 109, at 123-125.
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that that had been the effect of the Minister's refusal, then it
appears to me that the court must be entitled to act."'1
(iii) Failure to Exercise Discretion: Fettering
Where a discretion is given to a tribunal or individual, the formulation
of general rules as to the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised
may be inconsistent with its proper exercise. This does not necessarily
operate to prohibit the formation of a general practice, as long as hard
and fast rules are not applied indiscriminately without regard to the
facts of the case at hand. This is a particularly important consideration
in the administration of law where thousands of applications must be
processed each year, and some degree of efficiency is required. However,
as case law indicates, the interests of efficiency, and even consistency,
cannot be allowed to operate so as to fetter the holder of a discretion in
the responsibility to consider each application that comes before him or
her with an open mind.
This is probably the most fertile approach to take in any Divisional
Court application based on the examples previously given. It would be
difficult to see how a rigid application of the London "10% policy" could
not be viewed as a fetter on the exercise of the welfare administrator's
discretion to provide supplementary benefits in accordance with the leg-
islation and the needs of the individual applicant. There are a number
of interesting English cases dealing with the application of rules or poli-
cies which inhibit a welfare administrator's proper use of discretion.
In the case of R. v. Greater Birmingham appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Sim-
per 42 the applicant had been receiving welfare for several years. In ad-
dition to the basic allowance she was receiving an extra sum of 35p per
week for heating, which was an adjustment used where the basic amount
for a particular expenditure did not meet the actual expenditure, as au-
thorized under paragraph 4 of the Act. After two years of receiving wel-
fare she became entitled to an additional payment of a maximum of 50p
per week under paragraph 12, the purpose of which was to provide for
41 supra, note 24, at 1032-1033. Of course, this decision came from a very active
court dealing with what it perceived as an important economic issue. On the
positive side, the welfare legislation under examination here is much less sub-jective and the court would be dealing with a municipal body and welfare admin-
istrator, not a Minister.
42 [197411 Q.B. 543.
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certain things which were needed in cases of long term poverty. The Act
required the the welfare commission "shall have regard to" other pay-
ments when using its discretion in awarding an amount under paragraph
12. The commission's procedure was to "have regard to" any amount re-
ceived under paragraph 4 (35p) and automatically deduct it from the
5Op allowable under paragraph 12. In other words, rather than receiv-
ing the additional 50p under paragraph 12 she only received an addi-
tional 15p. The applicant's solicitor argued that the commission had
laid down a hard and fast rule rather than using its discretion, having
regard to the needs of the individual applicant. The Court agreed:
"... the person making a determination of the sum of money due
should exercise a broad judgement to ensure that in fact there is
no overlapping, but that he ought not to proceed simply on a
rule of thumb that exact deductions should be made. '"
A second English welfare case provides another pertinent example of a
welfare authority wrongly applying general rules. In R. v. Barnsley
Supplementary Benefits Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Atkinson 4" there
were actually two pre-set rules applied by the welfare commision to an
application for summer welfare from a student. The first rule used was to
deduct from his basic allowance a notional sum for maintenance because
of his father's income (on the assumption that his father was providing
that amount to him for the summer vacation.) Further, because of the
Commission's view that maintenance of students was not a proper func-
tion of the welfare scheme, it deducted a further amount from the appli-
cant's allowance of the basis that being a student constituted
"exceptional circumstances" that it was entitled to onsider under the
Act. The relevant section of the legislation was very broad:
'Where there are exceptional circumstances, (a) benefits may
be awarded at an amount exceeding that (if any) calculated in
accordance with the preceding paragraphs; (b) a supplemen-
tary allowance may be reduced below the amount so calculated
or may be witheld; as may be appropriate to take account of
those circumstances."
The Court of Appeal decided that the commission could not apply an in-
flexible rule of deducting set amounts from the welfare benefits of stu-
dents on the assumption that their parents were providing a sum for
their maintenance during the vacation. For the sake of convenience in
43 Ibid. at 549.
44 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 917.
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processing student applications, the commission could begin with this as-
sumption. However, it must be a rebuttable presumption and open to the
student to show the commission that his or her parents cannot or will not
provide the sum in question. Second, on whether "being a student" should
be considered an "exceptional circumstance" the court wrote:
"It cannot be right.., for the commission... to invoke the discre-
tion under paragraph 4(1)(b) to justify discrimination against a
whole class of persons... The trend of contemporary legisla-
tion, and indeed of generally accepted contemporary social at-
titudes, is firmly opposed to such discrimination. Wide as the
phrase "exceptional circumstances" may be, it must... have
been used in paragraph 4(1)(b) in reference to the particular
circumstances of individual cases. For these reasons we think
that the commission... if they deducted £1 from the claimant's
weekly benefit on the ground that the fact of his being a stu-
dent was an "exceptional circumstance", acted on an erroneous
principle which justifies the intervention of the court."'
It is interesting to note that the court in Ex parte Atkinson looked to the
"Supplementary Benefits Handbook" (i.e. policy manual) to determine
how to define "resources" as used in the legislation.
(iv) Use of Policy Guidelines
This leads to a discussion of the subsidiary issue of the legal import of
policy manuals, which are so frequently used by administrators to decide
issues in the welfare area. As was previously mentioned, section 3 of the
Act requires the Director of Income Maintenance of the Ministry to
"exercise general supervision over the administration of the Act and the
Regulations and [to] advise municipal welfare administrators.., as to the
manner in which their duties under this Act are to be performed." One of
the ways the Director performs this duty is through the publication of a
policy manual. In addition, because the Act treats Supplementary Aid
45 Ibid., at 925. For other relevant cases on fettering the exercise of discretion
see: R. v. Rotherham Licencing JJ., Ex parte Chapman, [19391 2 K.B. 710; R. v. Tor-
quay Licencing Justices, Ex parte Brockman, [19511 2 K.B. 784 (which includes a
carefully worded affidavit used to show no fettering took place); Re Hopedale
Developments Ltd. and Town of Oakville, [1965 1 O.R. 259; British Oxygen Co
Ltd. and Minister of Technology, [1971] A.C. 610, (which allows the Minister a very
broad power to adopt policies of general application); and R. v. Flintshire County
Council, Ex parte Barrett, [1957] 1 Q.B. 350 (where the court finds a general rule
cannot be applied to obtain consistency if it acts to prevent the consideration of
relevant facts in each individual application.)
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(as opposed to Special Assistance) in such a cursory fashion, municipali-
ties are directed to produce their own written policy outlining the re-
quirements for obtaining Supplementary Aid. It is unfortunate that rath-
er than using policy manuals to inform the interested public of "the rules
of the game" most municipalities consider their manuals as secret docu-
ments. The value of open, informative policy manuals is discussed in the
literature."The legal issue surrounding policy manuals is whether they
carry the force of law, in other words, whether they are binding, wheth-
er they can give rise to procedural obligations, or whether they can be
used as evidence of the matters that may legitimately be considered in
the exercise of discretion. Sometimes the evidence in question is not an
organized policy manual, but just circulars or letters of guidance on policy
matters from local or regional authorities. (This was the case in fact sit-
uation #1, where the municipal practice was to require applicants for
supplementary aid to cost share the expense with the municipality.)
Some cases discuss whether or not the policy guidelines in question were
produced as a requirement of the enabling legislation. Arguably, under
section 3 of the welfare Act, the provincial policy guidelines for the mu-
nicipal welfare administrators are produced as part of the Director's
mandatory responsibility to advise them in their duties.
This issue is discussed in the Supreme Court of Canada case, Martineau
and the Matsqui Inmate Disciplinary Board 47 where policy directives to
the Board, containing certain procedural rights and safeguards that were
to be afforded inmates during disciplinary hearings, were not followed.
In a split decision the majority decided that "while they are authorized
by statute, they are clearly of an administrative, not legislative, nature.
It is not in any legislative capacity that the Commissioner is authorized
to issue directives but in his administrative capacity."'
The weight of authority seems to be that policy guidelines of the type
issued for welfare administrators are not binding but can be used as fur-
ther evidence as to what matters should be considered in exercising a dis-
cretion. Policy guidelines might even be used to show an absence of good
46 See, for example, Molot, '"The Self-Created Rule of Policy and Other Ways
of Exercising Administrative Discretion", (1972), 18 McGill LJ. 310.
47 [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118. See also Bristol District Council v. Clark [1975] 1 W.L.R.
1443; and, R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex parte Hosenball, 11977] 1
W.L.R. 766. But see R. v. Liverpool Corporation, [19721 2 Q.B. 299 where the city
council was held bound by certain written statements regarding its policy to hear
interested parties.
48 [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118, at 129.
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faith on the part of the municipality or welfare administrator. For ex-
ample, correspondence is available from the London Welfare Adminis-
trator to applicants, in which they are told that the Municipality "is
not permitted" to spend more than $500 on any individual in one year for
supplementary benefits. The policy guidelines could be used to show
that this is simply not true and that what is required in expenditures
over $500 is simply the "rubber-stamped" approval of the area manager
for the Ministry.49
IV. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Supplementary benefits under the General Welfare Assistance Act of On-
tario provide low income wage earners and recipients under income main-
tenance programs with one of the only avenues for obtaining a variety of
items that are clearly basic to everyday living. However, the legisla-
ture of the Province has seen fit to include these types of items under Sup-
plementary Aid and Special Assistance.
In very practical terms this means that individuals in need are at the
mercy of their municipality and municipal welfare administrator. This
produces grossly unfair results with great inconsistencies in services pro-
vided from one municipality to the next and unconscionable hardship to
residents in less generous or less wealthy areas. While this is often
blamed on discrepancies in the tax base between heavily populated, ur-
ban centres and poorer rural municipalities, this factor certainly does not
always account for differences in services provided to needy applicants.
For example, the financial data on municipal welfare expenditures
shows that the City of London, with a population of 283,670 " spent
$71,327 in supplementary aid and special assistance in the 1983 fiscal
year. (This figure represents actual municipal dollars spent after cost-
sharing.) Thunder Bay, on the other hand, with a population of 121,380
spent $107,871 for supplementary benefits in the same time period.
This means that Thunder Bay, with a population only 42% the size of
London's, spent approximately one-third more in discretionary aid. Al-
49 Further evidence of "bad faith" occurs where the City of London welfare de-
partment finally issues a voucher for 90% of the cost of the requested item and
the voucher is stamped "valid for 24 hours".
The author was informed, shortly after the research for this paper was com-
pleted, that the City of London had changed a number of the welfare policies
that have been examined here.
50 Population figures are for 1982, supplied by the Ontario Ministry of Culture
and Tourism.
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though these figures represent only two municipalities, they at least
show that something other than size accounts for the disparities in wel-
fare services that exist across the Province. It is interesting to note that
London has one of the worst reputations in the Province for providing so-
cial services to its needy citizens, while Thunder Bay is known for a more
cordial relationship with its well-organized and active disabled com-
munity. These reputations seem to be borne out in the statistics.
There is a strong movement among administrative law academics to en-
courage improvement in the way discretion is exercised, by creating
change from within the system rather than by relying on the courts, be-
cause (these authors are quick to point out) judges often lack the back-
ground and understanding of the issues to make a well reasoned judge-
ment. In addition, they say, structuring of discretion at this level has a
more pervasive effect as opposed to judicial review, which is often seen
as a "band-aid" approach to the problem s1
In an effort to improve the fairness and efficiency of discretionary deci-
sion making, administrators are told to develop standards at the earliest
possible time and then try to further confine their discretion through
principles and rules. In the early development of standards an approach
should be adopted that allows for full participation of interested par-
ties, and the resulting rules, by which the discretion will be exercised,
should be available to the public. In other words, the affected parties
should help define the rules by which the game will be played and
have those rules at their disposal, for the purposes of compliance or
challenge, as the case may be. The goal of all of this careful structuring
of discretion is multi-facted: to allow an efficient exericse of discretion
where hundreds and even thousands of decisions must be made each year;
to allow for a greater degree of consistency within that body of decisions;
and, in other ways, to increase the level of fairness to the applicants.
There is no question that these are admirable goals. The difficulty lies
in the fact that most of the administrative structures referred to by these
academics involve "high-profile" tribunals or agencies like the Canadi-
an Transport Commission or the Canadian Radio-television and Tele-
communications Commission. The parties who are directly affected by
these commissions are primarily large corporations with enormous re-
sources and power. They are fully prepared, with a large legal staff in
51 See, for example, the varying approaches of T. Lynes, "Welfare Rights,
119691, Fabian Tract 393; R. Titmuss, "Welfare Rights, Law and Discretion"
(1977), 42 Political Quarterly 113; C. Reich, "Individual Rights and Social Welfare:
The Emerging Issues" (1965), 74 Yale LJ. 1245; K.C. Davis, "Discretionary Jus-
tice", (1969).
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tow, to participate in every way possible in the initial development of
standards for the exercise of the commission's statutory discretion. Fur-
thermore, once the standards and subsequent rules are in place, these par-
ticipants have the ability to monitor the system to ensure that discretion
is being exercised in compliance with the rules, that exceptions are being
considered etc.
Due to the nature of the parties coming in contact with these "high pro-
file" agencies there is often, in addition, recognition of some procedural
rights that should be afforded. Right to notice of hearings, right to
make submissions, right to certain information and reports prepared by
government and the right to reasons for the ultimate decision are just a
few procedural rights that are almost common place in administrative
agencies of this nature.
Contrast this scenario to the one involving the exercise of discretion by a
welfare administrator. This is really a different brand of administra-
tive law to which little attention is paid, either politically, or by most
lawyers, academics and the media. Welfare recipients are, for the most
part, poor, unorganized and powerless. There are no demands heard for
participation in the rule making process, and if there were they would be
summarily dismissed as coming from "bleeding heart liberals who have
no idea of what life in the bureaucratic front-line is really like". Even if
there were some mechanism for participation in the processes of estab-
lishing priorities and determining assessment procedures in awarding
supplementary benefits, it would be difficult to get interested citizen in-
put. Agency contributions (e.g. from community health clinics, legal clin-
ics, and some consumer rights groups) would undoubtedly be forthcoming,
but individual participation is difficult when the affected individual
does not have money for bus tokens to get to the meetings.
The importance that government attaches to a particular administrative
process is sometimes reflected in the procedural safeguards provided to
the applicant. In the area of supplementary benefits there are no pro-
cedural rights, in the strict sense. There is no right to make submissions,
no right to a review board hearing, no statutory right to reasons, no right
to anything axcept to take whatever is given, be grateful and, preferably
be quiet.
As long a society sees braces and wheelchairs, eye glasses and dentures,
transportation to medical appointments, clothes for infants, surgical sup-
plies and home oxygen equipment as optional by-products of its largess,
then there will be no procedural safe-guards, no meaningful limitations
on discretion, no open policies of participation and public distribution of
rules. The only safeguard that is available for the powerless, those
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without money, influence, or organization, is judicial review. Granted,
judges are a product of the society in which they live, and often mirror
the prevailing values. However, assuming the remedy is there, not to
use it because it is not a panacea to all the problems in the system, shows
callousness to the needs of individual applicants and a failure to recog-
nize the possible, systemic ramifications of one or two successful test cas-
es. (A discussion of the possible unavailability of even this remedy, due
to a lack of legal representation for the majority of welfare recipients,
will have to wait for another paper.)
Of course it is not being suggested that every detail of a supplementary
benefits request should become the subject of an application for judicial
review.' However, a few well argued cases, based on good fact situa-
tions, would hopefully begin to convince municipalities and welfare ad-
ministrators that they are, indeed, bound by certain legal principles
even in the exercise of their discretion.
There are other avenues that could be pursued. The Provincial govern-
ment should be encouraged to make supplementary benefits reimbursed at
100%, rather than 50% or 80% (depending on the class). This would re-
sult in consistency across the Province in the provision of basic, required
items and services that no one should be denied. One senior official in
the Ministry stated that "Relatively speaking, making supplementary
benefits 100% cost-shared would not be an expensive item in our budget."
In addition, section 13 of the Act might possibly be used to some benefit.
It states that "a municipality or the Province may provide assistance by
way of supplementary aid..." (emphasis added). Although this section
has never been used to allow individuals in municipalities to apply di-
rectly to the Province for supplementary aid, there is no reason it could
not be. The Ministry's position is that the section was included in the
Act to permit the Province to supply supplementary aid in areas where
there are no municipalities. Apparently in the northern part of the
Province the Ministry provides supplementary aid in a fairly generous
fashion, comparatively speaking. Why could an applicant living in
London, who had been denied supplementary aid by the municipality,
not apply directly to the Province? If the Province denies the applica-
tion, but would have granted it in the case of an applicant from northern
Ontario, is this not denial of "equal benefit" of the law? This is men-
52 For a discussion of certain caveats concerning the type of cases that a court
is likely to hear in the welfare area see the English Supplementary Benefits case,
R. v. Preston Supplementary Benefits Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Moore, [19751
1W.L.R. 624.
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tioned only to indicate that even the Charter should not be ignored as a
possible tool in this area.
The final comment comes from the late Chief Justice Laskin who provid-
ed in dicta, in his dissenting opinion in the Martineau case, a useful an-
swer to the traditional "floodgates" argument (so often heard regarding
judicial review of welfare matters):
"It is irrelevant to suggest that if the respondent's decision is overruled
there will be a flood of similar applications.., it is more likely that oth-
er tribunals would realize that they are expected to follow their own
rules of procedure."u
53 supra, note 48, at 119.
